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In the literature the issue of the protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is usually 
considered in a static context: how should the institutions of corporate governance be shaped having 
regard to already existing firms, conforming, in particular, to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair 
play. It is remarkable that no attention is paid to the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first 
be established, and that the founders-owners are the original shareholders. Moreover not necessarily the 
most appropriate protection of stakeholder interests can be provided by the institutions and practice of 
corporate governance,  specific kinds of legal provision may be more suitable. But rather than substitution 
complementarity prevails between different legal provisions protecting the interests of stakeholders (in 
particular  employees) and the stakeholder protection afforded through the institutions of capital 
governance, conforming to the logic of the different "varieties of capitalism". An aspect of the latter that 
is emphasized in the paper, and is usually overlooked, are the much higher rates of long-term 
unemployment associated with the continental European variety as compared with the Liberal Market 
variety of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. But the Scandinavian Social-Democratic market model gives the best 
of both worlds: low long-term unemployment rates and incidence, together with high degrees of 
employment protection. 
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1. Stakeholders, Externalities and Ethics 
The operation of firms in general, and of corporations in particular, affects the interests of many, 
either by commission or by omission. The legal and conventional prescriptions on who is empowered to 
decide on behalf of a company, the rules of decision, how the legal documents concerning the life of the 
company, such as budget accounts, product information, different types of disclosures, are formed and 
publicized deeply affect the way in which the different interests influenced by the activities of the 
company are impacted. At the same time the incentive structure that is created by these rules and the 
manner in which stakeholder interests are affected influence the overall performance of firms and of the 
economy. Among the different possible stakeholder interests that are impacted by what a firm does or 
omits to do the law distinguishes those which are relevant from those that are not, and prescribes how the 
interests of the relevant stakeholders are to be considered and protected. This the law does implicitly, 
when it considers some external effects and ignores others. Indeed this is what the law does in general, 
since the consequences of human behaviour are often numerous, far-reaching and of diverse nature. For 
instance, turning to a very clear instance, albeit far from the area of company law, modern western family 
law ignores the external effects that the choice of a spouse produces for the rest of the family (parents, in 
particular). But in other legal systems the consideration of these external effects are paramount, and the 
matching decision is attributed to the parents and not to the spouses themselves. Or, turning to labour 
law, the interest of actual employees not to be dismissed without verifiable justification is often considered 
and protected by the legal system, but usually not the interest of potential employees to be hired.1  
What are the criteria that guide the choice of the effects considered to be relevant? There are a 
number of possible alternative considerations, political, ethical, ideological etc. In the case of company 
law, the most relevant issue concerns the overall economic consequences of alternative regulations. But 
often considerations of morality and desert prop in. Even aside from specific philosophical and ethical 
considerations it is obvious that those empowered to take decisions on behalf of the firm should be 
expected, alike any other individual, not to pursue activities that run against widely shared moral principles 
(such as resorting to hold-ups or deceit--for instance it should be ethically inadmissible to knowingly 
deceive an employee about his effective career prospects just in order to extract greater effort from him--
or, looking at more extreme possibilities, to resort to murder, however perfect, or blackmail). As the 
American Law Institute puts it: “the absence of a legal obligation to follow ethical principles does not 
mean that corporate decision makers are not subject to the same ethical considerations as other members 
of society.”2 The sanction to unethical behaviour, when not provided by law, is the domain of social 
control, as a modality of private enforcement.3 In the case of corporations loss of reputation because of 
unethical behaviour can damage public image and goodwill, leading to loss of market value. Unethical 
behaviour can be sanctioned by the parties wronged, if they have the opportunity to react, and cost the 
firm the economic consequences of reduced trustworthiness. Of course the legal sanction, if provided, are 
probably more effective, potentially reinforcing the social ones. But what is unethical behaviour is not 
always clear-cut and there are areas of uncertainty where moral and economic issues are blurred, and 
where the moral judgement cannot be taken independently of the perception of the economic 
consequences of the rule that the judgement proposes or implies. For instance, for some it is unfair and 
immoral to lay off some employees (seen as stakeholders) simply because their employment is not 
profitable any more. The implied consequence of this assumed moral judgment is that this kind of 
behaviour should be made illegal. But what would the economic consequences of this rule be? The first 
could be that the expected cost of hiring would increase and, ceteris paribus, the demand for labour 
decrease, leading to lower wages and/or higher unemployment: in the end part of the cost of not 
dismissing unprofitable employees would fall on the additional unemployed, what does not seem very 
ethical. If the burden of excessive employment leads to the demise of the firm, all employees are  
                                                 
1 Sometimes however even the latter interest is considered, in anti-discrimination and affirmative action policy measures. 
2 ‘American Law Institute, 1992, quoted in Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 82. 
3 Cf. Kraakman et al., 2009, pp. 47-48. Moral norms are “'low powered' incentives of conscience, pride, and reputation” but not 
“less important in governing human behavior than are monetary incentives” (ibidem, p. 43). 
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eventually laid off and the argument against the rule becomes even stronger. Secondly, a mechanism 
leading to the allocation of labour where it is most productive is blocked, with possible adverse 
consequences on productivity, wages and, again, employment. It is in this kind of blurred area, where 
ethical and economic considerations appear to collide that economic reasoning could prove to be the 
most useful, aiding to form an informed ethical judgement based on the acknowledgement of the 
economic consequences of some assumed ethical rule, as translated into corresponding legislation. 
Moreover ethical rules vary according to epochs and civilizations. Ethical rules that run against 
technological and economic progress lead to lesser increase in productivity and living standards; we have 
examples of ethical rules based on religious beliefs that, even in our modern secular world, are hampering 
scientific and economic advance.4 Above all ethical convictions that clash with the basic foundations of a 
market economy (for instance, that any return to capital and enterprise is ethically unjustified being the 
consequence of “exploitation”, or that no employee should be ever dismissed, or that no interest payment 
is admissible, being tantamount to usury) may induce  types of behaviour in contradiction with its thriving 
and progress. On the contrary general acceptance of some basic principles of functioning can enhance the 
economic performance of a market economy and lead, potentially at least, to  "the greatest welfare of the 
greatest number". But in reality the basic rules of the game can vary a good deal, from American liberal 
capitalism  to Scandinavian social-democracy, and  to the German social market economy. In the latter 
case, for instance, the collaborative attitude of the social partners founded on the acceptance of the basic 
tenets of the social market economy may contribute to explain Germany's economic success. 
2. Who Are the Stakeholders and How Does the Legal System Take Into Account Their 
Interests?  
But then, who concretely are the stakeholders? First of all those who have a contractual relation 
(either explicit or implicit) with the firm5, such as the employees, who are protected by the labour code, or 
the creditors, who are protected by the civil and commercial codes, in particular by the rules concerning 
the faithfulness and transparency of accounts, as “sunshine is the best disinfectant”.6 But the notion of 
stakeholders also implies some kind of consideration for interests that are outside specific legal protection 
but may find some specific form of protection in the institutions of corporate governance.7 According to 
Freeman (1984) the notion of stakeholder extends to include “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”.8 At the same time the externalities that the 
operation of the company generates on people (possible “stakeholders”) who have no specific contractual 
relation with the firm enter in the scope of a number of legal provisions in defence of perceived public 
interests, such as environmental laws, public laws concerning the activities of the company relevant for 
local communities and public bodies, laws concerning the nature and quality of goods the company 
produces, anti-trust laws, and last but not least the criminal law, for preventing all sorts of criminal 
behaviour that can be committed in managing a corporation. Owing to the above, one may wonder 
whether there is any specific motive why the interest of stakeholders and of the public in general should 
                                                 
4 Such as in stem cell or family planning research. 
5 This is the notion of stakeholder in Freeman and Evan (1990, p. 354): according to them “the firm is best  conceptualized as a 
set of multilateral contracts among stakeholders”, where (p. 355) “’contract’ should be interpreted broadly to cover cases of 
‘implicit contracts’”;  they “distinguish ‘contract’ from one-shot exchanges, and intend it to stand for ’multiple transactions’ that 
require some governance mechanisms.” 
6 The transparency rules are of particular relevance not only for creditors but for other stakeholders, such as minority 
shareholders or contractors. For the importance of the quality of accounting standards for  investors see La Porta e al., 1998, p. 
1140. 
7 Thus it becomes rather vague. For a consideration of who could be seen as possible stakeholders see for instance Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995, pp. 85-86. 
8 Freeman, 1984, p. 46. It must be noted that the “affected” part was introduced by Freeman only because of the possibility that 
those affected by the organization would affect it in their turn. A previous definition by a 1963 memorandum of the Stanford 
Research Institute, quoted by Freeman, 1984, p. 31, refers to “those groups without whose support the organization would cease 
to exist”, such as “share owners, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society” (p.32), thus not much more restrictive, and 
very much in the perspective of strategic management.  
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be protected by the legal provisions concerning corporate governance, rather than by other specific pieces 
of legislation such as, for instance, in the case of employees, the labour code. At the same time the 
protection of the interest of shareholders, especially minority shareholders (who can be considered as a 
kind of special stakeholders, as they are deprived in practice of decisional power, aside from entry and 
exit, in a context in which information is not only imperfect, and costly, but fundamentally asymmetric) 
lies traditionally at the very heart of the issue of corporate governance.9 
3. The Instrumental Motive  
A first, but least interesting, approach to the stakeholder issue is the instrumental one, in the 
perspective of business administration. The fact that managers10 should take into account the interests of 
all whose behaviour is of consequence for the survival and growth of the firm is an obvious platitude, 
which lies at the core of the instrumental approach to stakeholder theory. The stakeholder view of 
enterprise management expounded in Freeman (1984)--predating by two years the fortunate book by 
Rappoport (1986) popularizing the notion of shareholder value according to which the corporation must 
be run in the interest of shareholders, creating value on their behalf11--is not necessarily in contradiction 
with the notion of shareholder value, since it refers to the stakeholder perspective as a chapter of strategic 
management. According to Freeman (1984) for the most effective pursuit of the objectives of the 
organization managers should pay due attention to all those who may contribute to its success, whatever 
the success criteria are supposed to be (thus including shareholder value). For example, the efficiency 
wage theory itself could be looked at from the viewpoint of the instrumental stakeholder theory of the 
firm. Other aspects of personnel management theory, such as how to shape the structure of pay or 
careers, may be seen in the same perspective: obviously a good manager should take into account the 
interests and preferences of the different stakeholders and the consequences of stakeholder behaviour on 
the attainment of the objectives assigned to the firm (such as profitability, or rather the long-term value of 
the firm, as argued in Jensen, 2010). But there is nothing particularly controversial about this. A more 
controversial and interesting aspect is the extent to which the various stakeholder interests should be 
taken into account per se, independently of their instrumental value.12  
4. Corporate Governance and the Varieties of Capitalism 
An  interesting problem concerns the overall economic consequences of different legal rules 
relating to corporate governance, and the way in which alternative systems of corporate governance, 
variously taking into consideration “stakeholder interests”, are associated to different “varieties of 
capitalism”, in particular the extent to which different rules and institutions aiming at the protection of 
stakeholders may be in a relationship of substitution or complementarity among themselves.13 As shown 
in Hall and Soskice (2001), complementary prevails,  in most cases probably as a consequence of the same 
social and political dynamics in the different legal areas rather than because of reciprocal enhancement in 
performance.14 In particular the rules of corporate governance and the provisions of labour law tend to 
dovetail rather than alternate in the protection of perceived labour interests.15 If consideration is given to 
                                                 
9 On this see in particular Shleifer and Vishny, 1997. 
10 By managers we intend here all those who have the responsibility of running the company, not only the top executives but also 
the directors. 
11 For an early eloquent statement see Friedman, 1970. 
12 For the consideration of the different possible aspects of stakeholder theory (descriptive, instrumental, normative, and 
managerial) and many references to the literature considering the different aspects, see Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
13 For the concept of institutional complementarity see for instance Armour et al. (2009). 
 14 The first kind of complementary is called by Amable “structural isomorphism”, while institutional complementarity refers for 
him to the case “when the presence of one [institution] increases the efficiency of the other” (Amable, 2003, p. 6). Here we use 
the term complementarity simply to refer to the protection of the interest of stakeholders in different institutional domains, 
which, as noted by Amable, actually presents notable variations in the different countries. 
15 On this see in particular Djankov, 2008. 
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other aspects of corporate governance, such as those concerning the protection of minority shareholders, 
the degree of contestability of managerial powers and the discipline of financial markets, we may arrive at 
the perception of two broad varieties of capitalism, Liberal Market Capitalism (of the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition) and Coordinated Market Capitalism (the continental European + Japanese tradition), with 
different advantages and disadvantages and various concrete results, which also very much depend on the 
more specific varieties, and national characteristics, of the countries concerned.16 Taking those 
characteristics into account Amable presents a more articulate classification, distinguishing between five 
different types of varieties of capitalism, “neo-liberal or market-based capitalism; Continental European 
capitalism; social-democratic capitalism; ‘Mediterranean’ capitalism; and Asian capitalism”.17  
5. The Founders’ and Financiers’ Perspective and the Lump of Firms Fallacy 
Many discussions on stakeholders vs. shareholders concern how an already existing corporation 
should be best organized in order to take the interest of stakeholders into account. As a clear-cut example 
we may take Donaldson and Preston (1995), where the issue of stakeholder management is seen 
essentially as a static ethical issue, without paying attention to the economic consequences of the different 
possible arrangements, and to the ethical implications of those consequences. What is remarkable of their 
thorough inquiry is that they do not consider the basic fact that a company in order to exist must first be 
established, and that the founders-owners are the original partners-shareholders. If the incentives they 
have for founding and financing the company are wanting, because, say, the law privileges the interest of 
stakeholders over those of shareholders, the company may not be founded and  not exist at all, or it may  
attain a smaller dimension, because of the lesser incentives to organize and finance its growth. In the 
founders’ perspective we can adopt different viewpoints: how would the founders best formulate the 
company charter in their own interest? And how should the legislator constrain the formulation of the 
charter from the perspective of the overall economic and social interests, taking into consideration the 
incentive structure that is created? In this the interests of stakeholders should be taken into account, but 
also how the imposed legal constraints may impact on the incentives of the founders, and thus on the 
supply of entrepreneurship.18 Furthermore: how do the rules and objective conditions governing the 
subsequent life of a firm, in particular the degree of consideration of stakeholders’ interests vs. the interest 
of shareholders, impact on the incentives to create the firm in the first place, but also on its growth and 
further development? A related important aspect here is the extent of the complexity of the procedures 
needed to have a firm registered or a company incorporated. More exacting procedures can better 
guarantee the stakeholder interests affected by the company’s very existence, but have a cost in terms of 
the propensity to found a company and supply entrepreneurship and risk capital. As an example of how 
the legal and environmental conditions affect the supply of entrepreneurship, and the birth and growth of 
new firms, we may refer to the relative abundance of venture capitalists and of so called “business angels” 
in the USA, which is by no means matched under European conditions, and that represents an important 
supply of crucial entrepreneurship, especially in technologically advanced and innovative firms.19 The 
supply of venture capital and entrepreneurship is greatly favoured by the relative ease a successful 
initiative can be cashed in by going public in a stock market endowed with depth and a great deal of 
liquidity, and a partnership be established in an institutional environment in which “employment at will” 
                                                 
16 See Hall and Soskice (2001). For the quantitative aspects of the two main varieties and of their national variations see also 
Damiani (2011). 
17 Amable, 2009, p. 20. 
18 On the issue of the efficacy of the legal enforcement of shareholder rights for the advisability of constraining the formulation 
of the charter see La Porta et al. (1998, pp. 1121, 1126). 
19 Cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 18, 100. “Business angels”, who are as a rule experienced older entrepreneurs, not only are sharing in the 
entrepreneurial function of risk taking, but are also involved in the assessment of entrepreneurial prospects and may variously 
affect the decisions relating to the running and development of the firm (cf. Chilosi, 2001, p. 329). More in general “financial 
development may play a particularly beneficial role in the rise of new firms” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p. 584) and  financial 
development is greater whenever outside investors (those not having a controlling share) are better protected (La Porta et al., 
1997; cf. also  La Porta et al., 1998, p. 1114), while “countries with poor investor protections indeed have significantly smaller 
debt and equity market” (La Porta et al., 1998,  p. 1152). 
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prevails and the labour market is relatively unregulated.20 In a different institutional context young 
innovative entrepreneurs would hardly have the same opportunities of creating and developing “gazelles”. 
Outside of the North American institutional context, one would have hardly expected a Steven Jobs (or 
Jeff Bezos for that matter) to come out of his family garage to build in a short time a technological 
advanced and highly innovative large enterprise. 21 The same conditions make much easier the solution to 
the problem of how to deal, for instance, with the decision by the owners of a family firm  that it is time 
to grow above or outside the family limits, because of the momentum of the growth of the firm or 
because of demographic reasons. In general the legal constraints and the overall institutional environment 
affect the process through which a firm may be required to change its legal setup in ways compatible with 
its growth, a process akin to molting in the natural world. So, in order to appraise the rules that govern the 
life of the firm, in particular those that take into account the interests of  stakeholders, however defined, a 
dynamic approach should be taken, one that considers the possible development of the firm, from its 
birth and its growth, to its possible demise. A pitfall to be avoided, which appears rather widespread 
instead, is a variety of the “lump of something fallacy” (found in the literature in the “lump of labour” 
version, as the idea that the amount of work to be done is given irrespective of circumstances), to assume, 
tacitly or explicitly, that the relevant data of a given situation will necessarily carry on in the future 
whatever the policy measures envisaged, which we may dub in our case the “lump of firms” fallacy. The 
number and types of firms and entrepreneurs at a given point of time  is indeed given, but what happens 
later (and what happened before) depends on the incentives produced by the institutional  setup, such as 
the regulations concerning the costs and timing of founding a firm, and the rules concerning corporate 
governance and the protection of stakeholder interest. 
6. Haziness of the Concept of Stakeholder Value   
The great disadvantage with stakeholder value (as the stakeholder approach is  referred to in the 
literature)22 as a guide to managerial behaviour, alternative to shareholder value, is the haziness of the 
concept, and of the basic concept of stakeholder itself. The consequence is, as Jensen (2010, p. 42) puts it, 
that “stakeholder theory plays into the hands of special interests that wish to use the resources of 
corporations for their own ends.” This applies as well to the idea that the “management of the firm must 
be oriented to satisfying the interest of the entity itself, and not the interests of one of its constituents”,23 
which finds an actual legal counterpart “whenever  corporate law mandates that the board act in the 
interest of the enterprise as a whole, a requirement which is of course open to multiple interpretations.”24 
The idea that managers should be empowered and trusted to pursue stakeholder value (such as in Berle 
and Means’ 1932 approach, even if at the time the terminology was different) has the major flaw that 
stakeholders are many and their “values” indeterminate and indeterminable, just as the notion of the 
interest of the firm as such. This, as “a smokescreen for board discretion”,25 simply empowers managers 
to do what they think fit, independently of their agency or trustee relationships with the formal owners of 
the firm (the shareholders) pretending that they are pursuing stakeholders’ interests.26 If managers are left 
as the interpreters and guarantors of stakeholders rights this leads to a lot of haze in the assessment of 
                                                 
20 According Ilmakunnas and Kanniainien (2001, p. 214) the rate of entrepreneurship (p. 208: “ measured as the ratio of non-
agricultural employers  and  people  working  on  their  own  account...to the total labor force”), is negatively related to union 
power in the economy. Analogous considerations apply to the various forms of legal labour protection (cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 18–
19).  
21 Cf. The Economist (2012). 
22 See in particular Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001, where the notion of stakeholder value is defined. 
23  Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005, p. 46.  
24 Hopt, 2011, p. 6. As a matter of fact “the corporate law of many jurisdicions provides that directors owe their duty of loyalty to 
the company rather then to any of its constituencies” (Kraakman et al, p. 103). 
25 Kraakman et al., 2009, p. 103. 
26 As Jensen (2010, p. 34) aptly puts it “stakeholder theory politicizes the corporation and leaves its managers empowered to 
exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources.” 
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managerial discretion and managerial results. This may increase the power to skim the value created by the 
company to managers’ own benefit, while managers can always pretend to have sacrificed the interest of 
shareholders to stakeholders’ interest.27 At the same time politicians, as a particular category of 
stakeholders, can benefit from the quid pro quo allowed by opaque arrangements with firms that have 
unclear objectives and possibly hazy budget constraints.28 And this can have a cost, in terms of lowering 
the interest of founders to found the company, of financiers to finance the company, of venture capitalists 
to launch venture capital initiatives with the prospect of being able to go public, getting a return with the 
more successful ventures, repaying the losses on the least successful ones. The fact, that we have already 
emphasized, is that a company is established by the shareholders as partners. If the firm is supposed to 
pursue the interest of different parties (employees, local authorities, politicians etc.), rather than that of the 
partners themselves, we may fairly assume that the interest in establishing and financing a firm assuming 
the relative risks is reduced and so is the potential supply of entrepreneurship.29 The possible advantage of 
the idea that the purpose of the company should have some social dimension (“corporate social 
responsibility”) rather than the creation of shareholder value, or that the company should be run “in the 
interest of the enterprise” rather than in the interest of shareholders could be in the area of psychology 
and social relations: Employees could be better motivated, and so more productive, industrial relations 
less antagonistic, public authorities and the public opinion better disposed and more cooperative, 
especially in cultural environments where profit creation tends to be considered tantamount with 
“exploitation” or “profiteering”. In those environments, if the declared ideology of the firm is different 
and more socially acceptable than the creation of shareholder value this could serve well the creation of 
shareholder value itself. Show business is indeed an important part of business. 
7. Who Owns the Company? Owners vs. Stakeholders 
Against the concept of shareholder value it has been objected that dispersed shareholders usually 
do not offer much entrepreneurship, they perform as financiers rather than as entrepreneurs. According 
to a  “politically correct” viewpoint,  shareholders should not even be considered owners of the company, 
but only providers of finance capital alike banks or bondholders.30 On the other hand shareholders are 
those who hold shares: shares of what, if not of the company? There are other situations of joint 
ownership where some of the owners are not playing an active role in the management of the common 
property, but are undoubtedly owners. Take for instance  the undivided property of a family house, or of a 
business venture whose shares  may be or may be not  tradable according to contract and regulations. The 
larger the number of joint owners, the lesser their individual rights and interest in the management of the 
common property, and the greater the collective action problem, but they are owners nevertheless. 
                                                 
27 Cf. Jensen, 2010, pp. 36-37. Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 87) are dismissive on this point observing that “the conventional 
model of the  corporation, in both legal and managerial forms, has failed to discipline self-serving managerial behavior.“ However, 
if the interest of stakeholders, instead of being trusted to managers  as is explicitly the case in a number of legislations (see Sjåfjell, 
2009, pp. 50 f.), is taken care through  some stakeholder representation in governing bodies (as considered in the following 
section) this could lead to a reduction of managerial discretion (and of the discretion of strong blockholders), rather than to an 
enhancement. 
28 Alitalia is a good case in point. In the case of Alitalia however the pathological consequences of stakeholder management were 
compounded by state being the controlling stockholder. As Gugler (2001, p. 203) puts it, commenting a thorough review of the 
economic consequences of different setups of corporate governance, “the evidence concerning state ownership is on the negative 
site”. But the actual consequences of  state ownership and control can be different in the different social and political contexts, 
and not always so disastrous as in the Italian case, where the cumulated past losses of state enterprises account for about half of 
the present huge public debt. (For a recent overview on the performance of state capitalism worldwide see The Economist, 2012.) 
For the relative worse performance of state owned in relation to private owned enterprises in mixed economies, see the empirical 
analyses reviewed in Megginson and Netter, 2001, sect. 3, pp. 328–338. 
29 This is bound to have an impact on the labour market since demand for labour is intrinsically derivative from the supply of 
entrepreneurship (the activity of launching as well as that of running a firm). Increasing the supply of entrepreneurship and its 
quality (which, among others, depends on the incentives for entrepreneurs to perform effectively) enhances the capability of the 
economy to create and maintain jobs. See on this Chilosi, 2001, p. 328.  
30 Cf. Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005; Sjåfjell, 2009, pp. 32-35 and 80-82, and the literature quoted there. 
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Analogous considerations can be put  forward in relation to the viewpoint of Margaret Blair and 
Lynn Stout (2005) who  concentrate, more than on the economic consequences, on the legal aspects of 
the issue.31 According to them the fact that in practice the directors of public corporations are appointed 
by other directors (“corporate law gives shareholders a right to vote on a slate of directors that has 
normally been selected by the existing directors”) rather than by shareholders (in particular dispersed 
shareholders have no influence) means that the shareholders are not the  owners of a corporation and 
directors are not their agents, but only “‘fiduciaries’ with respect to the corporation and its stockholders” 
(quoted approvingly from a publication of Robert Clark, p. 13). This notion of directors being fiduciaries 
of stockholders is quite reasonable since shareholders are many, with different conceptions and interests, 
thus it would be difficult to see them collectively as a principal.32 However even with fiduciaries the 
analogous moral hazard and asymmetric information issues as in the paradigm principal-agent apply. At 
the same time the notion of a fiduciary relationship between directors and stockholders seems to 
contradict the two authors' notion of directors as “'mediating hierarchs' who must balance the competing 
needs and demands of shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, executives, rank-and-file, and even 
the local community”, a kind of variation on a Berle and Means' theme. Whatever the de facto behaviour 
of dispersed shareholders (who in practice behave as rentiers rather than as active owners), directors 
normally are elected by shareholders.33 Moreover, unlike dispersed shareholders who are blocked by the 
collective action problem, shareholders with a controlling quota of the shares and important shareholders 
such as pension funds have actually a say or even a determining voice on the main strategic decisions of 
the company and the appointment of directors (the controlling shareholder may even appoints himself  as 
CEO). Finally even minor shareholders have an impact on the running of the company through exit, even 
if they have no voice, by affecting the variations of its capitalization, and thus of the wealth of controlling 
shareholders and directors, as a consequence of shareholders' appreciation of how the company is run and 
its changing future prospects. In general, the evolution in the market capitalization of a company is an 
instrument of control through which shareholders, big and small (i.e. “the market”), may express their 
judgment on the way the company is run, judgment that management would duly take into consideration.  
8. Shareholder value, stakeholder value, and the social function of profits 
 But the dispute on the nature of company ownership is in reality a red herring: the real issue is of 
what  rights and legal protection should be assigned to shareholders (however defined in terms of 
ownership), and the economic consequences of the different legal disciplines. Whenever shareholders 
have lesser rights and are less guaranteed in the enjoyment of those rights the depth of the financial 
market  suffers, the extent to which firms are financed through bank credit rather than risk capital 
increases, the attractiveness of creating start-ups decreases. Furthermore  the pursuit of shareholder value 
is tantamount to the pursuit of the profitability of the firm.34 Profits, the difference of the value of what a 
firm produces and what is accounted for as costs,  provide both a motivation and, directly or indirectly, 
                                                 
31 For a thorough critical discussion of  a previous version of Blair and Stout ideas see Meese (2002). 
32 The possible variety of the interests of shareholders, not allowing to consider them as a homogeneous group with a common 
interest, is stressed by Sjåfjell. 2009, p. 85. In fact this obviously applies, even outside of the business company, to any situation of 
shared ownership, where the interest and objectives of the sharing owners can be quite different. But a possible common 
denominator could be the maintenance and  enhancement of the market value of the shared good (think for instance to the case 
of the owners being the family members with joint ownership of an inherited estate or of a business venture). Analogous 
considerations apply to any collective body of interest (such as employees or  pressure groups). The variety of positions does not  
usually prevent from considering what could be seen as the objective common interest of the group, such as, in case of 
shareholders, the viability and long-term profitability  of the company. 
33 Usually through a majority voting rule, but in most cases through a plurality voting rule in the USA (Kraakman et al., 2009, pp. 
58-59). But there are exceptions. The most relevant being that of employee representatives in the company boards (cf.  Sjåfjell. 
2009, p. 53). The most interesting case is that of the Netherlands between 1971 and 2004, where directors of some large 
corporations were legally selected by incumbent directors, with no shareholder participation (Kraakman et al., 2009, pp. 56, 94-
95). In many other instances this may happen de facto, especially where share ownership is widely dispersed, as is the case in  
large American corporations (ibidem). 
34  For the notion of shareholder value and its limitations see Chilosi and Damiani, 2007 and the literature quoted there. 
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the resources for continued existence and the long-term growth of the firm.35 If the market values of 
inputs and outputs are taken as a proxy of social opportunity costs and benefits (admittedly quite a far-
reaching assumption) the profitability of the firm measures not only private but also social value 
creation.36 Probably no better proxy exists, while the degree of accuracy of the proxy depends on the 
institutions and regulations whereby issues such as externalities, market power and imperfect and 
asymmetric information are dealt with.37 A troublesome issue is the time frame, as long as there may be 
contradiction between shareholder value in the long and in the short run.38 The relevant notion of 
shareholder value should be for the longer run (what we may call sustainable shareholder value), but in 
practice  a tendency to short-termism is lamented whenever the current stock exchange valuation is an 
overwhelming managerial concern (such as it is often reported to be the case in the USA). At the same 
time the issue of the time framework potentially weakens the efficacy of the shareholder value criterion: 
indeed any short-term fall in the market valuation of the firm can be justified as being in accord with 
longer-term value creation. But in the end it is for the market to judge what the long-term prospects of a 
company are. 
An argument of the proponents of the stakeholder view,39 is that enterprise costs are not social 
costs because they include variable amounts of stakeholder surplus (such as employees’ surplus) that is 
created or destroyed by the firm in its multifarious activities, and it is not accounted for. For instance, 
when a firm scales or shuts down, the costs saved are not really equal to the social opportunity costs; only 
in the introductory textbook model of the perfectly competitive economy it is otherwise. In practice the 
local communities lose, and workers lose the difference between their actual wages and their reservation 
wages.40 But concretely no better approximation to a firm’s social costs and benefits than that provided by 
its accounts seems to be available. The idea that market values can be taken as the best practical 
approximation to social opportunity costs and benefits is the basic justification of a market economy, 
which, paraphrasing Churchill, is “the worst form of economic organization except all the others that have 
been tried”. When proposing, explicitly or implicitly, alternative policy rules the implied structure of 
incentives and related overall economic consequences should be careful appraised. For instance, should 
employment maintained at all costs? Should a firm ever be allowed to close a plant or layoff workers? 
Should employees instead of shareholders be legally entitled to appoint directors and top executives? If 
some of these rules were accepted the negative consequences on aggregate productivity and employment 
could be far reaching.41 If we are not ready to accept them in general they should not be invoked either 
                                                 
35 As Sjåfjell(209, p. 51) puts it, “The future life of the enterprise and the profit of the involved investors are generally 
interwined.”  
36 Cf. Jensen, 2010, p. 34: “value is created—and when I say “value” I mean “social” value—whenever a firm produces an output, 
or set of outputs, that is valued by its customers at more than the value of the inputs it consumes (as valued by their suppliers) in 
the production of the outputs. Firm value is simply the long-term market value of this expected stream of benefits.” 
37 Cf. Jensen, 2010, pp. 34-35.  
38 Cf.  ibidem pp. 38-39. 
39 See for instance Charreaux and Desbrières (2001). 
40 In part the loss can be the consequence of sunk costs and of  factor specificity whereby “a factor would lose part of its value if 
used” outside a given production arrangement (Caballero and Hammour, 2000, p. 5), and, more in general, of pecuniary 
externalities that are absent only in general equilibrium model of a perfectly competitive economy, but not in the real life of 
imperfectly competitive markets. 
41 Owing to overall budget constraints, if somewhere losses are covered,  somewhere else resources that could be normally put to 
more productive use are distracted. In particular, labour mobility is an important factor enhancing productivity and growth (see 
on this Martin and Scarpetta, 2011). Moreover “In well-developed market economies, the evidence is overwhelming that the 
pattern of reallocation is productivity enhancing. Accounting exercises show that a large fraction of total factor productivity and 
labor productivity growth at the industry level is accounted for by the reallocation of outputs and inputs from less productive to 
more productive businesses” (Bartelsman et al., 2004, p. 4). As a consequence, if the process of resources reallocation is hindered 
the process of productivity and income growth can be thwarted. On the other hand some employment protection could be 
justified by imperfect information, externalities and lack of contractibility of employment insurance arguments,  advanced by 
Belot et al. (2007) to explain an empirically derived (with the data from 17 OECD countries) inverse U-shaped relationship 
between employment protection and economic growth.  
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explicitly or implicitly in any single case, both for coherence and because the application in any single case 
validates the rules in the aggregate.  
9. Stakeholder Management in the Japanese System 
Probably there are no actual legal system where a rule empowering employees to appoint 
managers and top executives of companies formally exists. However, according to a view “employees' 
sovereignty” exists de facto in Japan while “shareholders' sovereignty” is simply a legal fiction (H. Itami, 
quoted by Koyama, 2010, p. 372). According to Itami this is the case in the complex system of cross 
ownership and control in the Japanese keiretsu, with the selection of managers among top employees 
through co-optation. For Tachibanaki (1998, pp. 20-22) the Japanese firm is a “labour managed firm”, in 
the sense that “although it appears to be owned by the shareholders and monitored by debtholders, in 
reality the firm is owned by its employees”, while “the stability of the firm, the safeguarding of jobs, and 
coordination for directorates are the most important goals for top executives.” Such a system of 
governance can more easily apply to an already established structure of big interconnected firms 
reproducing and enlarging itself but it can be hardly compatible with the creation of new companies by 
individual innovative entrepreneurs. In the environment of an already existing industrial system of big 
companies, such as in post-war Japan, further firm growth and foundation of new firms by the existing 
ones could be ensured by the introduction of a managerial system neglecting the short-term interest of 
shareholders and privileging the interest of other stakeholders such as employees, whereby companies are 
chiefly financed  through retained profits and the keiretsu bank. This can be a possible  explanation of the 
peculiarities of the Japanese corporate governance system arising in the after war period with the demise 
of the zaibatsu and of older controlling shareholders, purged because of their relationships with the 
previous regime, and the formation of the keiretsu. But following the stagnation of the Japanese economy 
in the nineties a reform of the commercial code with the aim to put the Japanese governance system more  
in line with that of  other OECD economies was  undertaken in 2005 (cf. Koyama, 2010). At any rate, 
even in the case of de facto dominance by employees interests in corporate management, the interest of 
equity owners whould be considered to the extent that some equity financing is required and sought for, 
analogously to the case of corporate control by dominant self-interested blockholders in relation to 
dispersed shareholders. Otherwise the fact that profits are mostly retained appears  not to be peculiar to 
Japan, part of value creation being captured elsewhere too by the increased value of shares accompanying 
the growth  of corporate assets  and expected profits.  
10. Stakeholder Representation in the Governing Bodies42   
A way for taking into consideration the interest of stakeholders (or rather of some of them) that is 
more plausible than to trust to managers the balancing of the different stakeholders’ interests, à la Berle 
and Means,43 is to have stakeholders’ (in particular employees’) interests to be represented in the 
governing bodies, and the balancing of some of the different shareholder and stakeholder interests to be 
the result of the internal organizational dynamics of the firm. The representation of stakeholder interests 
could be either spontaneously engineered by the controlling blockholders in choosing the board of 
                                                 
42  For a synthetic overview of the  various institutional varieties of employee representation in Europe see Sjåfjell, 2009, pp.  64-
67. 
43  According to Berle and Means (1932, p. 356), managers should become “a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of 
claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy 
rather than private cupidity”. For them “public policy” would be the outcome of a program set forth by “corporate leaders”, “for  
example  … comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization of business” (p. 
356). This conception could be seen to find an institutional counterpart in the traditional Japanese corporate governance system, 
where there is no formal legally prescribed stakeholder interest representation, but directors take care informally of a bundle of 
complex stakeholders interests: “managers represent the company but never represent its shareholders or employees. It is the 
managers who represent 'the company itself'” (Koyama, 2010, p. 369). The Japanese articulate framework of strong social control 
may have been able to keep potentially arbitrary managerial power in check. 
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directors (for instance by giving a seat to bank representatives, as is often the case in the German 
governance system)44, or be legally imposed.45  
10.1. Stakeholder Representation and Implicit Contracts  
A motive for having stakeholder interests represented in corporate governance could be to 
provide a kind of guarantee for implicit contracts stipulated with the workforce, but also with other 
stakeholders, such as customers or suppliers (including banks, as credit and financial services suppliers), or 
local authorities and the state. By their very nature implicit contracts cannot be normally  enforced 
through the courts. Moreover, since they are not explicit, their content may be unclear, and assumed to be 
different by the different parties involved. Thus it may be difficult to realize whether and to what extent 
they are fulfilled or not. Stakeholder representation, such as in company boards or in works councils, 
could be seen as a guarantee for their implementation and as a vehicle for reaching some kind of general 
consensus on their interpretation through steady interaction and communication by the representatives of 
the parties involved. This kind of representation would not necessarily be adversary to the interest of the 
owners in general, and of the founders in particular, because it could save on the cost and time of building 
trust and could help in creating the expectation of implicit contracts compliance. The implicit assets and 
liabilities, and the relations of trust built up implicitly by the firm with its stakeholders could be reflected 
in goodwill, and thus in its net value.  
10.2 Stakeholder Representation as a Control and Collaboration Device  
Employees’ representation in company boards could also bring about some additional supervision 
of managerial behaviour that, because of the specific information that employees have on the running of 
the companies, may also turn out to the advantage of non controlling shareholders, especially in case the 
employees who are represented are also shareholders.46 The informational exchange that this may bring 
about could be to shareholders’ advantage because it could favour better informed managerial decisions 
and a more collaborative climate of industrial relations reducing the probability of industrial actions.47 This 
applies also to other kinds of employee representation such as works councils.48 The credible sharing of 
information ensured by codetermination could make wage claims moderation and deterioration of 
working conditions acceptable in case of enterprise difficulties. Decentralized bargaining at the firm level 
in particular can take place in an atmosphere of greater trust, and Pareto improving agreements can be 
struck more easily. This has been the case in Germany’s metal industry, where workers have accepted 
increases in working hours at unchanged pay in exchange for employment guarantees, following the 
Pforzheim agreement of 2004 (“mainly targeted at reducing costs at company level, for instance, through 
an increase in the duration of working hours while freezing or cutting wages”, leading to “controlled 
                                                 
44 For the literature debating the relevance of the presence of bank representatives in supervisory boards of German corporations 
see Fauver and Fuerst (2006), pp. 680-81. One may note that, owing to the German widely practiced system of vote delegation 
through banks by dispersed shareholders, bank representatives in corporate boards of theoretically wide held companies may be 
considered as representatives of the de facto controlling blockholders rather than of stakeholder interests as such (cf. Morck et al., 
2005,  p. 666). The role of banks in German corporate governance through vote delegation is downplayed by Hopt (2011, p. 51). 
45  For a synthetic survey of the way in which concretely these kinds of arrangements are produced not only in Germany, but in a 
number of other countries see Allen et al. (2009), pp. 7-8. Indeed “many west European countries now mandate employee-
appointed directors in at least some large companies” (Kraakman et al., 2009, p. 100). Cf. also Hopt, 2011, pp. 55-56. 
46 “Labor representation introduces a highly informed monitor to the board that reduces managerial agency costs (such as 
shirking, perk-taking, and excessive salaries) and private benefits of blockholder control” (Faver and Fuerst,  2006, p. 680). As a 
matter of fact, according to the inquiry of Ginglinger et al. (2009) on French companies  “directors  elected  by employee 
shareholders unambiguously increase  firm  valuation  and  profitability”. There are some studies (cf. Coles et al. 2008) that show 
that insider directors may be beneficial to value creation, especially in high tech firms. But these refer to directors who are freely 
appointed rather than appointed on the basis of outside legal compulsion. 
47  Cf. Fauver and Fuerst (2006), p. 673. On the other hand there are cases of  labour representatives in the supervisory boards 
taking advantage of their position to organize  strikes that were particularly damaging for the company (Kraakman et al, 2009, pp. 
210-201). 
48  Kraakman et al, 2009, p. 102. 
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decentralization”).49 But there is also the possibility that insider workers and managers could collude 
against shareholder interests, especially of minority and disperse shareholders, in particular by blocking the 
working of the “market for corporate control” while defending existing employment levels even when this 
jeopardizes the long term profitability of the company.50 According to a number of inquiries considering 
governance systems where some employee representation in corporate boards is legally required, 
employee representation appears to be beneficial for the creation of firm value, provided it does not 
exceed some threshold (say, one third of seats).51 One can wonder then why forms of employee 
representation have to be made compulsory at all; as long as they appear to be in the interest of 
shareholders one would expect to be present in the internal organization of companies, even without legal 
external compulsion. But as remarked long ago by Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 473), “A striking fact 
about industrial democracy is that it cannot be effected on any significant scale voluntarily. Without fiat, 
codetermination would be virtually nonexistent.” The case for legally mandated codetermination can be 
made if it can be shown that through its favourable external effects social partners could avoid being stuck 
in otherwise sub-optimal Nash equilibria, or because of some other overall favourable consequences on 
the complex organization of society and the economy. Looking at the external effects, a possible 
advantage of codetermination, as well as of profit participation remuneration schemes, is to have an 
additional party interested in the publicity and faithfulness of the accounts, and in reigning in top 
managers’ compensation,52 to the advantage both of fairness, reduced inequalities, and even of efficiency 
since “lean cats may run faster than fat cats”.53 Without compulsion a single firm engaging in co-
determination when the others do not could be negatively affected.54 Among the externalities that systems 
of employee representation generate we could consider the pursuit of overall macroeconomic social and 
economic objectives such as in the architecture of the German social market system. In particular, the 
social compact implicit in the latter enhances the opportunities for macroeconomic collaboration between 
social partners. But, depending on the social and economic setup there is always the possibility that at the 
macroeconomic level the enhancement of the protection of the interest of represented stakeholders, 
insiders in particular, in corporate governance could turn to the disadvantage of some weaker segments of 
                                                 
49 Ilsøe (2010), p. 40.  
50 Cf. Hopt, 2011, p. 57. In the case of the German Mitbestimmung the power of insiders finds a limit in the countervailing power 
of strong blockholders. The theoretical and empirical literature on the overall economic consequences of the German 
Mitbestimmung in particular, and of codetermination and of employee stock ownership and “voice” in general, appears to lead to 
complex and partially contradictory results. As argued by Kraakman et al. (2009, pp. 111-112) a disadvantage of employee 
representation (and one may extend this viewpoint to stakeholder representation in general) is that it complicates and makes more 
difficult the decision making process. As concluded by Hopt (2011, p. 58), “ In  the  end,  the  impact  of codetermination is an 
empirical question that still has to be conclusively answered.”  For a synthetic recent survey of the issue see Ginglinger et al., 
2009, pp. 5 f.  
51  Cf. Allen et al. (2009), pp. 26-27.  
52 However Hopt (2011, p. 58) on this has a sobering note: “labor seems to be not really interested in whether there are higher or 
lower pay levels for directors”. But this is actually changing, both for labour and for shareholders reacting to directors’ excessive 
pay in the aftermath of the economic crisis. 
53  Chilosi, Damiani (2007), p. 10. The reason lies in the potentially negative income effect of higher incomes on managerial effort. 
Thus every measure for reigning in the high pay of top managers (such as making top executives remunerations subjected to a 
binding shareholder vote, as recently declared  in the UK by the Cameron government; cf. Allen, 2012) could be defended not 
only in the name of equality and fairness but also in the name of productivity enhancement. Moreover “you wave enough money 
in front of people, and good people will do bad things” (Franklin D. Raines in  Bloomberg 2003). For the markedly higher 
remunerations of top managers in relation to that of manual workers in the UK and especially in the USA in relation to Germany 
and Japan where forms of stakeholder control formally or informally apply see Damiani, 2011, p. 224. According to a different 
view the high open remunerations of American top managers are matched elsewhere by the hidden advantages of control, as 
borne out by the much higher price associated to the transfers of control packets of shares ( Dyck and Zingales, 2004), whenever 
blockholders can control the companies with a modicum of direct capital ownership, in particular through pyramid schemes (very 
widespread feature of capital market ouside USA and UK: see Morck, 2005), in a context of lower protection of minority 
shareholders, and lower contestability of corporate control. (On the different legal protection of shareholder rights in the various 
legal systems, and its economic consequences, see La Porta et al., 1998; on the various extent  of private benefits by controlling 
shareholders in the different jurisdictions and the reasons thereof see Krakman et al., 2009, pp. 107-111.)  
54  Fauver and Fuerst, 2006, p. 679. 
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society, such as consumers, or the unemployed (for instance by pushing for higher wages and better 
working conditions, reducing the opportunities for increasing employment). But this kind of outcome 
could be also the consequence of any other measure aimed at the protection of insiders, such as that 
provided in particular by the labour code. Insiders are usually in much larger number than outsiders, as 
well as more vocal and organized, so it pays to legislators to stand in favour of their interest rather than 
for the interest of outsiders, unless at least the well-being of insiders is negatively affected by the 
precariousness of their position when there is a relevant chance to become outsiders (as we shall see in 
what follows). 
11. Workers’ Representation Vs. Labour Code Protection 
Not necessarily the best protection of the legitimate interests of stakeholders may be sought in 
the architecture of corporate governance, some other legal provisions could be more suitable. The 
protection of the interests of insider workers and of their firm-specific investment55 through employees’ 
representation in works councils or enterprise boards does not necessarily guarantee any given employee 
since, even omitting the possibility that the representatives be “captured” by the interest of management 
or of the owners, employees’ representatives may well act, in theory at least, in defence of a subset of the 
work force (such as those endowed with lower human capital and lower remuneration, in case of an 
egalitarian viewpoint, or the reverse, in case of a more hierarchical perspective) rather than of the work 
force as a whole. The provisions of labour law may be in this respect a better instrument, since they 
guarantee everybody’ rights in an employment contract. But codetermination may be the counterpart of a 
social bargain struck between the different social components at the political level towards exchanging 
some institutional protection of insiders (which could also favourably affect employment stability and 
overall working conditions), against some overall political and social consensus and wage moderation, 
reducing the restrictive consequences on employment that it could otherwise be expected from the 
protection of insider interests, as in the German social market model. Analogous considerations apply 
even more to the Scandinavian model of industrial relations. But one may speculate the extent to which 
                                                 
55 The issue of firm specific investment is often emphasized to justify employees’ legal protection and the existence of internal 
labour markets. However the argument is not entirely persuasive. It is difficult to envisage any acquired skills that could not be 
used at least in some other firms of the same industry, except in the case of monopoly or strong market power, such as in the  
state administration (where the process of specific investment may start, with the perspective of entering the public internal 
market, already during the educational process), or in state railways, or in the IBM in its heydays. As remarked by Lazear (2003, p. 
1) “it is difficult to generate convincing examples where the firm-specific component [of human capital investment] approaches 
the importance of the general component”. Firm specific investment appears rather to be concentrated at the beginning of the 
employment relationship: for instance the cost of moving, of learning the rules and habits of the firm, to get knowing new 
colleagues, etc. It is unclear that its further building-up could be incentivated by employment protection, unless at least if 
accompanied by strong career motivation. Indeed, employment protection has been shown to be a factor hindering workprice 
training ( Brunello, 2006). An additional related factor refers to the information about the employees that the firm acquires in the 
course of their employment and workers’ investment in acquiring reputation inside the firm, which could not be easily 
transferable outside. The investment is reciprocal: the firm too invests in acquiring specific information as to the quality of its 
employees and has an interest in protecting this specific investment, as well as past investment in training. This is a protection 
against unfair dismissals that occurs even without any specific legal protection. To that it could be added the loss of reputation 
endured by a firm among its own workforce in case of unfair dismissals; this loss of reputation is avoided not only if the fairness 
of the dismissal is legally verifiable but also in case it is simply observable by the employer and the workforce (even if not 
verifiable in court proceedings), allowing an extended leeway for firms to decide layoffs that are substantially, even if not 
verifiably, fair in case of absent legal protection, without enduring reputational losses. Finally, if insiders' protection leads to 
greater difficulties to find a job for outsiders (such as when it leads to the increase of long-term unemployment) the protected 
insiders (if the protection is not really watertight as it is in public employment in some countries) could be motivated to take 
advantage of their  protection for concentrating on the accumulation of generic human capital as an insurance for having a better 
chance to find another job, in case of actual lay-offs. In case of lower protection (and higher probability to find another, albeit less 
satisfactory, job in case of dismissal because of lower long-term unemployment) insiders could be better motivated to cooperate 
in the accumulation of firm-specific capital in order to increase the probability of keeping their more satisfactory employment and 
career prospects, without risking really to become long-term unemployed in case of lay-offs. But in case of a system of dualistic 
labour contracts, where short time contracts are used as a buffer stock by the employers who are unable to get rid easily of long 
term employees, the expected reduced length of employment of short time workers may lead to lesser training and lesser human 
capital investment, both generic and specific. For a recent paper where the issue of firm-specific investment is considered, in 
relation  to the productivity consequences of employment protection see Damiani et al. (2011). 
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this is the outcome of specific corporate governance and labour market institutions or of the specific 
social, political and national context that allows effective centralized wage bargaining to take place.56  
12. Insiders, Outsiders and Long-Term Unemployment 
Privileging through the institutions of corporate governance and  the labour code the interest of 
entrenched insiders, such as blockholders and existing employees, can go against the interest of outsiders, 
such as would-be employees and minority shareholders. Protection of the interest of insider workers limits 
the mechanism that in a market economy, however very imperfectly, tends to shift labour wherever in the 
economy its productivity is higher. This, together with “decreased work intensity among the employed” 
and “increased worker absenteeism” can affect negatively overall productivity (Skedinger, 2010, p. 7, see 
also p. 14). The studies surveyed by Skedinger, in his thorough review of the existing literature on the 
employment protection legislation and its economic consequences, “indicate that stringent employment 
protection leads to less dynamics in the economy” because “employee turnover is reduced by fewer firings 
and hirings, while structural change also goes more slowly due to less job creation and destruction, while 
exits and start-ups of firms are also reduced” (ibidem p. 14). At the same time protection enhances 
“employment prospects … for those who already are securely placed in the labour market, while the 
opposite holds for vulnerable groups, especially the youth. Employment protection therefore works as a 
regressive redistribution mechanism on the labour market” (ibidem, p. 7). The countries (such as Italy, 
Germany or France) where the protection of insiders is higher are also characterized by a markedly higher 
rate and incidence of long-term unemployment than the countries, such as the UK or USA, where 
protection of insiders is lower (with the notable exception of the Scandinavian countries).57 In the ten 
years 1999-2008, for instance, the average long-term rates of unemployment (where long-term 
unemployment is defined as unemployment of one year or longer) were as follows: USA 0.5; UK 1.3; 
Germany 4.7; France 3.4; Italy 4.7. More extensive data averaged over the seventeen years 1991-2007 are 
reported in Table 1, together with the OECD employment protection index, averaged over the same 
years, in the last column..58 The countries are arranged in five different groups (according to Amable's, 
2003 and 2009, classification)59: the first one corresponds to the the Anglo-Saxon Liberal Market 
Economies (LME), as defined in Hall and Soskice (2001), the second to Continental Europe coordinated 
market economies (CME), the third to Mediterranean Europe market economies (MME), the fourth to 
the Scandinavian social-democrat market economies (SME), the fifth, with scanty overall data, to the 
South-East Asian market variety. From an inspection of the data it is immediately obvious (as one would 
expect) the association of employment protection with higher level and incidence of long-term 
unemployment. With two exceptions. First of all there are two outliers: Ireland presents relatively high 
long-term unemployment rate and incidence together with low employment protection (but in more 
recent years the performance becomes more in line with that of the other LME), and Austria, where the 
reverse applies: an explanation may be found in a system of industrial relation akin to the  Scandinavian 
social-democratic type.60 But the most remarkable case is that of the Scandinavian countries, where low 
long-term unemployment rate and incidence are associated with high degrees of employment protection. 
                                                 
56 The specific national context of Denmark, enhancing overall trust in industrial relations, is emphasized by Ilsøe (2010). For the 
Scandinavian social-democratic model in general see Andersen et al. (2007). 
57 For the data on long-term unemployment in the different countries the reader is referred to the ILO database, in the KILM 
(Key Indicators of the Labour Market), 6th edition, freely accessible and downloadable from the ILO Internet site. Some aggregate 
data are reported in Table 1. 
58 "Unweighted average of version 1 sub-indicators for regular contracts (EPR_v1) and temporary contracts (EPT_v1)", where 
EPR_v1 is "sub-indicator for dismissal of employees on regular contracts" and EPT_v1 is "sub-indicator for strictness of 
regulation on temporary contracts" (OECD 2010). 
59 Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 21) consider France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey as belonging to a Mediterranean 
variety, which however is not dealt with by them in detail. 
60 Cf. Amable (2003), p. 138. And in fact according to Boyer (1997) classification (quoted in Amable, 2003, p. 83) Austria belongs, 
together with Sweden, to the social-democratic model. The relative small size and possibility greater internal social cohesion could 
be another factor making Austria's performance closer to that of the Scandinavian countries. 
Alberto Chilosi Stakeholder Protection, Varieties of Capitalism, Long-term Unemployment         15 
 
Their exceptional labour market performance could be attributed to specific institutional factors such as 
“high unionization, highly coordinated wage bargaining geared to wage compression, active labour market 
policies ... More specifically, the institutional system, based on coordinated negotiations between  strong 
partners and supporting policies by the government, may be seen as a way of offering security to workers 
without some of the drawbacks of tight legislative labour market regulation” (Andersen et al., 2007, p. 40). 
In other terms, social cohesion and centralized decision making, taking into consideration the overall 
consequences of wage policies on employment rather than defending the interest of insiders, bring about 
wage moderation. This, together with the pursuit of active labour market policies, make high levels of 
employment protection compatible with high levels of employment and low levels of long-term 
unemployment.  But the Scandinavian recipe requires the fulfillment of a set of social and political 
conditions that are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, especially in the Mediterranean countries, where 
usually more militant trade-unions undergo competition from  rank and file anti-system trade union 
groups (such as the Italian COBAS). Trade union competition may in turn lead to a greater emphasis on 
employed workers' satisfaction and on achieving wage raises rather than high employment levels. As noted 
by Richard Freeman (1988, p. 65)  “Economies  at the extremes  -  with highly  centralized  or highly  
decentralized  labour  markets -  had  better employment  records  than  those  economies  'betwixt and  
between'”. Even size could be a relevant factor, the smaller size of Scandinavian countries being better 
compatible with their centralized corporative institutions than it could be the case with larger economies 
(ibidem, p. 78). One may note from the data that in the USA, where “employment at will” is the rule and 
the Employment Protection Index is the lowest, both the rate and the incidence of long-term 
unemployment are the lowest.  
Of course other factors could be relevant here, such as the extent and duration of unemployment 
benefits.61 The latter are different in the different countries considered (higher in Germany, but also in the 
UK, in relation to Italy, for instance, where they are particularly low). In general the comparison between 
different countries is made in terms of overall unemployment rates (such as in Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 
20, where the coordinated market economies appear to present on average lower unemployment levels in 
the period 1960-1998),62 but it is long-term unemployment that represent the main source both of 
economic waste and of social suffering.63 Wherever, as in the LME, there is greater flexibility in the labour 
market and greater propensity to change jobs, this leads to higher labour mobility and hence to higher 
rates of frictional employment, which can be seen as functional to the greater dynamism of the labour 
market.64 As argued by Skedinger (2010, p. 7), “there is a great deal of evidence which indicates that both 
dismissals and hirings decrease at approximately the same rate” as a consequence of employment 
protection. At the same time “the evidence that aggregate employment and unemployment are affected by 
                                                 
61  For the issue of omitted variables affecting the way in which employment protection impacts on employment and 
unemployment, see Skedinger, 2010, p. 88. 
62 This applies to various other studies that purport to determine the consequences of alternative institutional setups on 
unemployment, such as, recently, Amable (2009) or Gatti et al. (2009). The data on the incidence of long-term unemployment in 
the year 2000 of a set of OECD countries presented by Schmitt and Wadsworth (2005, p. 176) are in accord with the  overall 
picture of Table 1. Their general remark that “other, less flexible arrangements can achieve” lower level of long-term 
unemployment (p. 177) may find comfort in the special case of the Scandinavian countries, as well from that of the Asian 
countries such as Japan of South Korea.  
63 “One should recognise that the experience of long-term unemployment is a horrid one for those unfortunate enough to 
experience it” (Machin and Manning, 1999, p. 3085). Moreover while ceteris paribus short-term unemployment may be instrumental 
for helding in check inflationary wage raises, in this respect long-term unemployment is pure waste: “long-term unemployment, in 
contrast to the short- term variety, contributes very little to holding down wage pressure and hence inflation … The long-term 
unemployed are far enough away from the active labor market that their presence has little influence on wages” ( Nickell, 1997, p. 
57). 
64  There are three possible reasons why the LMEs can present higher levels of short-term unemployment in relation to CMEs: 1. 
Higher rates of discouraged workers in the CMEs because of the lower probability of finding a job associated to higher rates of 
long-term unemployment in a more rigid labour market (resulting in lower participation rates: see  the third column of Table 1). 2. 
Higher rates of entrapment of employed workers who, in case of a more flexible labour market, would leave their current 
employment in order to find a more satisfactory job. 3. Firms may have a greater propensity to lay off workers as the costs and 
hassle of layoffs are lower. As a matter of fact “In countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom gross job and 
worker flows are almost twice as large than in most continental European countries”  (OECD, 2009, p. 6). 
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such a regulation, whether positively or negatively, is relatively weak” (ibidem).65 But in a given rate of 
aggregate unemployment quite different rates of long-term and short-run unemployment can be hidden 
(see the different rates of incidence of long-term unemployment in Table 1). According to Hall and 
Soskice, (2001, p. 22) the greater capability of the LME to create jobs (albeit on average less durable and 
with greater income inequalities) may be reflected in the higher full-time equivalent employment rate in 
relation to the CME.66 
Even if on the whole labour market flexibility is associated with lower long-term unemployment 
rates, it could be argued that some workers, even if unemployed, may prefer, if given the choice, a setup 
where the labour market is more rigid, unemployment higher, and the probability for the unemployed to 
find a job lower, possibly labour productivity and average wages lower, but once a job is found employees 
enjoy legal protection and a lifetime (or at least long-term) employment prospect, and thus greater peace 
of mind. However inquiries in the satisfaction provided by different contractual arrangements in different 
normative setups do not surprisingly report greater degrees of satisfaction and feeling of security for 
workers who are taking advantage of strong legal protection of their permanent employment contract 
(Skedinger, 2010, pp. 8, 15). Here two circumstances can be relevant: the first is the awareness of the 
greater difficulty to find another job in case of layoffs;67 the other is what we may call the entrapment 
factor:68 the danger to end up trapped in a less preferred and less rewarding job than under an alternative, 
more flexible and less legally constrained labour relations system, owing to the greater risk of leaving one’s 
job and the difficulty in finding, once unemployed, a different, more suitable, one. More generally, labour 
market regulation weakens the allocative mechanism (such as  expounded by the hedonic theory of 
wages)69 through which workers tend to be allocated to jobs that they relatively prefer and where they are 
relatively more productive.  
                                                 
65 See also Bassanini and Duval, 2006, p. 9: “In line with a number of  previous studies, no significant impact of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) on aggregate unemployment is found.” 
66 Obviously there are other criteria for comparing the performance of economic systems that are of paramount relevance, such 
as the capability to generate technical progress and growth. Calmors and Driffil (1988) consider the way in which the degree of 
centralization in wage settings affect macroeconomic performance, arriving to the conclusion that the extremes (either fully 
centralized wage setting or complete decentralization) work the best. This is compatible with the data of table 1, as far as long-
term unemployment is concerned. For a broad consideration of the institutional factors affecting a composite index of labour 
market performance see Pieroni and Signorelli (2002). On the negative consequences of employment protection on labour 
mobility and productivity growth see Martin and Scarpetta, 2011. 
67  The empirical studies surveyed by Skedinger “indicate that employees with permanent jobs perceive less security in countries 
with stricter legislation” (p. 118). In Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) while “workers feel less secure in countries where jobs are 
more protected” this does not apply to “permanent public jobs, suggesting that such jobs are perceived to be by and large 
insulated from labor market fluctuations”. 
68  Skedinger (2010, p. 116) refers to “locking-in effects” induced by employment protection. In case of entrapment, and  the 
overall market conditions that may lead to it,  it would much more risky to heed the exhortation by Steven Jobs: “the only way to 
do great work is to love what you do. If you haven't found it yet, keep looking. Don't settle.” 
69 Cf. Rosen, 1986. 
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USA 0.52 9.45 5.4 66.1 0.21 
UK 2.24 31.09 6.7 61.4 0.66 
Canada 1.03 12.21 8.4 65.6 0.75 
Australia  2.05 26.01 7.4 63.5 1.05 
Ireland 4.54 47.33 8.4 57.4 0.98 
Average 1.73 25.2 7.26 62.8 0.73 
      
Germany  4.21 48.25 8.6 58.5 2.54 
 France    3.8 39.66 10.3 55.3 3.01 
 Belgium  4.48 55.91 8.2 51.1 2.52 
Netherland  2.15 42.97 4.8 61.4 2.4 
 Austria  1.23 25.75 4.1 58.3 2.13 
Average 3.17 42.51 7.2 56.92 2.52 
      
Italy 5.8 59.34 9.8 48.1 2.69 
Spain 7.34 45.76 15.5 52.4 3.31 
Greece 5.08 53.25 9.6 52.1 3.27 
Portugal 2.47 43.66 5.9 60.7 3.67 
Average 5.17 50.5 10.2 53.33 3.24 
      
Denmark 1.52 24.36 6 66.1 1.71 
Finland 2.9 26.61 10.8 61.7 2.08 
Sweden 1.71 22.7 7.1 64 2.44 
Norway 0.6 13.62 4.3 65.6 2.69 
Average 1.68 21.82 7.05 64.35 2.23 
      
Japan 1 24.5 3.9 62.4 1.58 
Korea 0.1 2.6 3.5 61.2 2.32 
Taiwan NA NA 3.1 NA NA 
Singapore NA NA 3.7 65.4 NA 
Hong Kong NA NA 4.3 61.4 NA 
Average   3.7 62.6  
aCountry averages for the years 1991-2007. Source: ILO (2009);. last column: Oecd (2010).  
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12.1 The Dual Employment Solution 
There is a possible mixed dual solution whereby labour protection is restricted to a section only 
of the labour force. This kind of  solution may be pursued de facto with the underground economy, where 
all sorts of  legal provisions are not observed, or de jure whenever different labour contracts, in particular 
temporary employment contracts with lower legal protection, are allowed. The advantage in relation to 
complete flexibility lies in the fact that the social and economic costs of long-term unemployment could 
be lessened while maintaining for the lesser protected section of the labour force some prospects of being 
promoted to more stable and guaranteed employment. The structure of incentives that is created depends 
concretely on the perspective of temporary employment to become permanent, which may be slight if 
employers prefer to avoid incurring the costs of more permanent labour contracts even for  workers they 
would otherwise prefer retaining, bringing about termination of the employment whenever the maximum 
legal length of temporary employment is reached. This can have negative productive consequences if only 
because of the lower propensity of temporary employees and employers to invest in the employment 
relationship.70 Of course much would depend on how more onerous are the regular contracts in relation 
to a sequence of temporary ones.71 
The postwar Japanese economy presents a clear-cut case of  a dualistic labour market where a 
core part of the labour force enjoys lifetime (or rather long-term)72 employment (with associated 
incentives to undergo specific investment as provided by the career motive) while the residual part is 
subjected to more precarious temporary employment with larger labour turnover.73 This institutional setup 
has made compatible the lifetime (or rather long-term) employment model with low levels of 
unemployment, but also with high inequality in the distribution of earnings.74 Another factor is provided 
by the residual component of married women employed in precarious and lesser paid employment and 
discouraged from taking part in the labour market in periods of lower labour demand. Other relevant 
features are more stable employment relationships, and thus relatively low labour turnover, adjustment in 
the number of hours rather than in the number of employees in case of reduced sales, and a relatively high 
share of self-employed.75 
13. Politicians as Carers for Stakeholders’ Interests 
A further approach to the defence of stakeholder interests is to have them trusted to the political 
establishment and public powers through intervention on a case by case basis, formally (such as through 
golden shares) or informally, through the political influence exerted, for instance, with the leverage of 
publicly owned or controlled banks, or through the public regulatory capacity, or with the instruments of 
power, by twisting the rule of law (the Russian way). The record on this account does not look on the 
whole brilliant. Often, even when not directed towards milking resources for the pursuit of petty political 
interests, government interventions, allegedly for defending the interest of stakeholders, aim, in 
continental Europe in particular, to stimulate those decisions by firms that lead to higher employment, but 
especially to restrain the decisions that bring about employment reductions. Recent instances are the 
                                                 
70 On the possible negative productivity consequences of short-term contracts see in particular Damiani, Pompei (2010). A reason 
can be in particular the lower interest of the employers in training employees whose permanence prospects in the firm are seen to 
be low. 
71 On the consequences of liberalizing short-term employment see Skedinger, 2010, pp. 63-64, 107, 125-26. 
72 Even in the paramount Japanese case we have long-term rather than life-long emloyment, as “there are only about 10-15 per 
cent of male employees who have never changed employers during their careers” (Tachibanaki and Taki, 2000, p. 10). 
73 In Japan  “the majority of employees such as female employees, part-time workers and workers in smaller firms are not 
covered” by the long-term employment system reserved to men employees in big enterprises (Tachibanaki, 2000, p. 11). The 
coexistence of a core section of protected workers with a relatively large one of temporary less paid employees can be found also 
in the case of Korea, where the recorded incidence of long-term unemployment is minimal. Cf. Grubb, Lee and Tergeist (2007), 
p. 12. 
74  Japan's Gini is relatively high among OECD countries at 37.6 (in 2008; source CIA Factbook 2011). 
75  Cf. Tachibanaki and Taki, 2000, p. 12.  
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encroachment by the German government on the destiny of the Opel GM subsidiary during the  crisis, or 
that of the Italian government on the Fiat decision to close the Termini Imerese production plant, or the 
pluriannual Italian costly drama concerning the destiny of Alitalia. Interferences of this sort are bound to 
have negative consequences both on the allocation of scarce financial and human resources and on 
entrepreneurial incentives, even if prima facie they may seem to be justified by serious social and public 
order concerns, and by the consideration of the short run difference between private and social costs. In 
appraising this kind of policy actions one should take into account, as argued above, the overall 
consequences of the general rules that are implicitly asserted, such as: «the closure of any given plant, 
however unprofitable, should not be permitted», or «the government should always do whatever it is in its 
power to avoid layoffs, even at the cost of covering the losses». The consequences of following this kind 
of rules on the propensity to invest in new initiatives, to hire, to open new plants, to maintain profitability, 
and on the use of scarce budgetary resources can be quite damaging. Moreover we have here an obvious 
case of contradiction between the protection of insiders and the interest of outsiders, such as workers 
whose opportunities of finding an employment are thwarted by the misallocation of economic resources 
and the reduction of entrepreneurial incentives, taxpayers who are financing the subsidies for loss-making 
plants, recipients of social expenditure or social services whose supply is curtailed because of the 
alternative use of financial resources, etc. But in these cases the insiders are known, the outsiders are 
undetermined, and this, psychologically and politically, makes a lot of difference. Moreover there is the 
well known fact that politicians are often prone to be captured by organized interests rather than to be 
guided by the long term consequences of their policy actions. This may be particularly damaging in case by 
case ad hoc interventions, outside the constraints of a general legal framework. Here too there may be 
exceptions. During the recent economic crisis keeping the automotive industry afloat in the USA by ad 
hoc interventions has been vindicated by the subsequent return to profitability showing long-run viability. 
In exceptional times, where the normal working of capital markets is paralyzed, exceptional interventions 
in the public interest may be justified. 
14. Minority Shareholders as Stakeholders 
Minority and dispersed shareholders could be perceived as kind of stakeholders whose interest is 
impacted by the decisions of controlling blockholders and top management. Indeed, as remarked above, 
part of the legal provisions affecting corporate governance, such as those concerning the publicity and 
fidelity of accounts, are aimed at protecting non-controlling shareholders. The same applies to the 
mandatory bid rule that allows non-controlling shareholders to share in the control premium. More 
generally, the law provides guarantees for the co-owners of a business each towards the others. Thus its 
constraints may not be adverse, but rather favourable to the forming of agreements establishing a 
company, by reducing transaction costs through standardization, while disciplining and preventing ex-post 
opportunistic behaviour and protecting the interest of other types of stakeholders such as creditors, or the 
inland revenue and taxpayers. At the same time the advantages of standardization should be balanced 
against those of subsidiarity, by granting to the partners the autonomy of deciding how best to pursue 
their own interest in drafting the charters, as long as this is not contrary to the protection of a perceived 
public interest. Contestability of corporate control provides some guarantee for non-controlling 
shareholders against misuse of corporate resources, and may work as an instrument leading to a better 
allocation of productive resources overall. It appears the more effective in the Liberal Market Economies, 
where the protection of investors is also overall greater..76 The mandatory bid rule makes bids to acquire a 
controlling share more onerous, reducing the potential challenge to established positions.77 At the same 
time it may reduce  the potential instability in corporate control, and the tendency towards excessive 
short-termism when managers are all too dependent on the changing moods of the stock exchange instead 
of planning for the long term. In constituencies where the overall protection of dispersed shareholders is 
lower the mandatory bid rule can increase the interest of savers to participate to the stock market, as it 
                                                 
76 In particular “the United States and the United Kingdom still have by far the most takeovers of any country in the world” (La 
Porta et al., 1998, p. 1120). 
77 Cf. Kraakman et al., 2009, p. 124; Schuster, 2010, p. 8. 
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increases the probability even for non controlling  shareholders to collect eventually the real value of their 
shares, without expropriation of part of it by the controlling blockholders.78 But it may also hinder value 
enhancing transfers of corporate control, while preventing some  value decreasing transfers.79 As often is 
the case, there are no clear-cut answers, only trade-offs. But on the whole better protection of shareholder 
rights may lead to better economic performance.80 
15. Conclusion 
In the end we should always be aware that the economic consequences in the different 
institutional and social contexts of alternative legal disciplines may be quite different. One may refer here 
as an extreme case to the disastrous consequences of the introduction of some capitalist market 
institutions, especially in the corporate and financial area, in Russia after the demise of the URSS.81 In 
particular “Russia's negative experience during the mid-1990s is a cautionary reminder that 'self-enforcing' 
governance strategies still require an honest judiciary and  a strong securities regulator to be effective”.82 
As an instance of the fallacy of composition, rules apparently in favour of some stakeholders do not 
necessarily have unambiguous favourable consequences on the category to which the stakeholders belong. 
For instance, security of tenure in employment may have important productivity consequences (by 
limiting incentives and blocking an important mechanism for reallocating resources where they may be 
more productive) that may (or may not, as is apparently in the Scandinavian case) turn against workers’ 
living standards and opportunities of employment. Or, going to a hypothetical extreme, a legal rule 
empowering employees instead of shareholders to appoint a controlling majority of directors would 
probably be to the disadvantage of workers in general:  it may well correspond to the ethical principles of 
someone, but can be nefarious for the category the rule itself would aim to protect, considering its 
possible impact on the propensity to invest, innovate, and create firms and jobs. At the same time the 
approach to stakeholder theory privileging the protection of stakeholder interests as opposed to value 
creation may work as a powerful ideological instrument for favouring special interests, such as of 
managers or controlling shareholders wishing to escape the constraints of the market for corporate 
control, or of politicians wishing to wield political power and influence through their interference in the 
running of firms, to the detriment of what could be perceived as the general interest. 
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